Clemson University

TigerPrints
Publications

English

7-1-2020

It Is All About Location: Smartphones and Tracking the Spread of
COVID-19
Jordan Frith
Michael Saker

Follow this and additional works at: https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/english_pubs
Part of the Communication Technology and New Media Commons

948257

research-article20202020

SMSXXX10.1177/2056305120948257Social Media <span class="symbol" cstyle="Mathematical">+</span> SocietyFrith and Saker

2K: Covid19

It Is All About Location: Smartphones and
Tracking the Spread of COVID-19
Jordan Frith1

Social Media + Society
July-September 2020: 1–4
© The Author(s) 2020
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305120948257
DOI: 10.1177/2056305120948257
journals.sagepub.com/home/sms

and Michael Saker2

Abstract
Mobile phone location data have become tied to understandings of and responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. Data
visualizations have used mobile phone data to inform people about how mobility practices may be linked to the spread of the
virus, and governments have explored contact tracing that relies upon mobile phone data. This article examines how these
uses of location data implicate three particular issues that have been present in the growing body of locative media research:
(1) anonymized data are often not anonymous, (2) location data are not always representative and can exacerbate inequality,
and (3) location data are a key part of the extension of the surveillance state.
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It is a strange feeling when something you have been
researching for almost a decade suddenly becomes a part of
the public conversation. That happened to the two of us when
discussions of COVID-19 started intersecting with mobile
phone location data. We have studied mobile phone location
data since we were doctoral students, and we have argued
that institutions should be more transparent about how much
location data they collect (Evans & Saker, 2017; Frith, 2015).
Somewhat surprisingly, it took a global pandemic to drive
home that point.
Within a few weeks of the virus’ spread in the United
States, discussions of location data were everywhere; visualizations of mobility practices became a recurring feature of
media outlets, and governments began discussing the use of
location data to track the mobility of infected people. This
essay argues location data’s 15 minutes of public fame is a
potential opportunity to raise attention about locational privacy issues that were present long before COVID-19.
Namely, we look at three major locational data issues implicated by the current pandemic: (1) anonymized data sometimes are not anonymous, (2) locational data are often not
representative and can exacerbate inequality, and (3) location
data are a key part of the extension of the surveillance state.
We conclude by asking whether this moment of visibility for
location data collection could provide an opportunity to push
for new media literacies.
Mobile phones have transmitted location data since the
advent of cell towers (Ling & Donner, 2008). However, the
accuracy and the number of actors who collect location data

have shifted. Actors—ranging from telecoms to Google and
Apple to individual app developers and whoever they sell
data to—collect location data produced through mobile
phones, and people have little recourse to understand how
their data are being used and who has access to them (Frith,
2015). Take as an example the recent visualizations of cell
phone location data used to show everything from the travel
patterns of spring breakers to the distance people traveled in
mid-March after stay-at-home orders were given; however,
people were left guessing where the data came from.
Regarding the spring break visualization, for example, CNN
was unable to track down the origin of these data (Barrett,
2020). A series of New York Times visualizations that tracked
movement in relation to stay-at-home orders reported they
received their data from an intelligence firm called Cuebiq
(Glanz et al., 2020), which raises questions about where
Cuebiq got these data, and so on.
Data visualizations are just one example of the increase in
attention given to location data during the pandemic. A more
prominent example is government (and sometimes corporate) digital contact tracing. Digital contact tracing involves
identifying infected individuals and then tracing the people
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they have been in contact with. For the most part, this process uses Bluetooth technology that logs when devices are in
close proximity to another device associated with an infected
user for a prolonged period of time. Contact tracing applications feature different design choices and sources of data,
and these choices—for example, whether the data storage is
decentralized or whether the Bluetooth data are combined
with GPS—raise different levels of privacy concerns (Bell,
2020). Specific systems aside, digital contact tracing raises
important questions about issues such as locational privacy
and digital inequality that should be addressed, especially
because some experts think these apps will neither be particularly effective nor sufficiently adopted to render them
useful (Alkhatib, 2020; Bell, 2020).
The locative functions of smartphones have been a major
focus of the field of Mobile Communication Studies (MCS)
for more than a decade (Campbell, 2018), and much of that
research has focused on privacy issues (de Souza e Silva &
Frith, 2010). While COVID-19 does not raise wholly novel
locational privacy issues, it does increase the public visibility of issues associated with locational data. By no means is
the list below comprehensive, but we tackle three of those
issues and conclude by speculating about whether the pandemic could be an opportunity to raise awareness of the
extent and consequences of the location data our smartphones transmit.

Issue 1: Anonymized Data Are Often
Not Anonymous
The COVID-19 pandemic has led to an explosion of popular
science communication, such as the data visualizations
detailed above. These visualizations use anonymized mobile
phone data to visualize people’s mobility. The spring break
visualization, for example, put anonymized dots on a map
and visualized how they spread across the United States as
they left Florida. The data are scrubbed of individual identifiers, which supposedly make it acceptable from a privacy
standpoint. However, these visualizations and the broader
use of anonymized data raise serious issues about how effective anonymization is.
In the mid-2000s, America Online released a huge amount
of anonymized search data to the public. Through only a
handful of search queries, researchers were able to deanonymize some of the data and track it back to individual users
(Barbaro & Zeller, 2006). And the same has been shown with
location data: one study took an anonymized location dataset
and found that “four spatio-temporal points are enough to
uniquely identify 95% of the individuals” (de Montjoye
et al., 2013, p. 1). Consequently, the anonymized data visualizations used to visualize mobility in relation to the pandemic
could raise similar issues and work as a conversation starter
about how identifiable apparently “anonymous” location
data actually are.
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Issue 2: Location Data Are Not Always
Representative and Can Exacerbate
Inequality
One of the problems with the occasionally blind faith in big
data has been ignorance of just what data are collected and
who it leaves out (boyd & Crawford, 2012). That has always
been true for location data as well. Back in the early 2010s,
the LiveHoods project produced maps of Foursquare checkins, and some outlets used these maps to show the “popular”
areas of the cities. However, the maps were markedly devoid
of check-ins in large parts of the city. Were those areas
empty? No. Instead, they were often minority areas of the
city where people did not use Foursquare (Frith, 2017). As
locative media research has shown, context and marginalization matters with location data (Graham & Zook, 2013).
Digital contact tracing will likely exacerbate the inequality already present in locational data analyses. Most of these
apps work by using Bluetooth to record the proximity
between handsets so people can be alerted if someone gets
sick. Obviously, people can only be alerted if they own a
smartphone. Consequently, children, the homeless, some
elderly, non-adopters, and people without financial means
will be left out of the analysis (Alkhatib, 2020). Even many
people who do own smartphones will not be able to participate because their devices do not have the proper low-energy
Bluetooth capabilities. Even if these people wanted to participate in digital contact tracing, they will not be able to and
will instead be rendered invisible in the analysis, with consequences possibly far more serious than the neighborhoods
left out of Foursquare maps.

Issue 3: Location Data Are a Key Part
of the Extension of the Surveillance
State
Some of the very early writing about locative media—mostly
from artists—discussed its surveillance potential (Tuters &
Varnellis, 2006). Knowing where a device is or what it is
close to raises obvious surveillance concerns. And much of
the locative media literature has tracked how surveillance
has become more extensive as smartphones have become
more widely adopted. After all, locational metadata played a
role in Edward Snowden’s revelations, and the ability to
track location is a major piece of the larger surveillance state
(Frith, 2015).
As many activists have warned, the embrace of digital
contact tracing could involve strengthening the surveillance
state in unprecedented ways, which is why privacy protections are so important (Bell, 2020). And the history of surveillance suggests it can be difficult to roll back surveillance
technologies once they have been enacted (Lyon, 2010).
Much of the surveillance state built after 9/11 remains in
effect almost two decades after the attack. Maybe the
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location data collection authorized through contact tracing
would be removed once the pandemic passed. Just as likely,
however, is that these systems remain in place to deal with
the “next” outbreak, a possibility some privacy advocates
fear (Alkhatib, 2020). And the longer these systems remain
in place, the more entrenched they inevitably become, and
the more uses they will likely accrue.

The Pandemic and Media Literacies
Looking for any silver linings amid a global pandemic seems
almost crass, but the rise of popular data visualizations and
digital contact tracing could be an opportunity to increase
people’s knowledge about the extent of data smartphones
share about their lives. We recognize that improved media
literacies around these issues are only one small part of a
larger puzzle. As media scholars have argued, many issues
that can supposedly be solved by improved media literacies
need to be addressed at the level of policy to be effective
(Vaidhyanathan, 2018). That is certainly true of digital contact tracing as well. The policy and architectural levels are
where decisions about what to collect, where to store the
data, and how the data can be used will be made. However,
an expanded knowledge of how smartphones work and questions about where data come from can help people make
decisions when choosing how to engage with these apps and
their smartphones more generally. They can also become
pedagogical tools within media classrooms. Students can
track down where popular mobile phone visualizations got
their data (and often end up at dead ends). They can learn
about the deanonymization of datasets and the broader access
and marginalization issues present in projects like digital
contact tracing.
While these literacies will not solve the questions surrounding digital contact tracing, they can help people engage
differently with personal decisions about whether to use
these apps and to ask questions about how they work.
Smartphones constantly transmit location data, which can
then make its way into various datasets without their knowledge. Those datasets might be anonymized, but that is often
not as foolproof as the word makes it sound. Contact tracing
apps create logs of who people are near, which has major
surveillance potential that might never disappear once the
apps are created. And on top of those concerns, locative datasets leave out certain users and can essentially render people
invisible if they are not using the right technologies.
At this point, it is debatable how successful contact tracing will even be in combating the virus. But what is not
debatable is that they, along with various COVID-19 visualizations, raise important questions that have long been present in the locative media literature. We hope that by raising
these issues now, the increased attention paid to locative data
could be an opportunity to improve media literacies in the
future. In particular, these visualizations and contact tracing
apps could be valuable pedagogical tools to get students and
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members of the general public to think more deeply about
just how revealing, or not, a picture their smartphones paint
of their everyday lives.
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